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Jing Jing Chang’s book focuses on how post-war Hong Kong cinema’s fate and fortunes, circa 1 9 5 0 s-late 1 9 6 0 s, were inextricably bound up with the context of the Cold War. For Chang, Hong Kong cinema of this 
period simultaneously imagined communities while constructing apolitical 
images that obscured the volatile political situation in post-war Hong 
Kong. Rather than a top-down enterprise from colonial authorities to 
subjects, Chang argues this situation was born out of a complex triangular 
relationship between colonial state, local filmmakers, and audiences. 
She posits that what was screened and what was screened out were 
equally important in the role films played in building Hong Kong’s post-
war community. Hence, Chang’s methodological approach of “screening 
communities” sheds light on how certain strands of Hong Kong cinema 
operated in the colony, which both elucidates and revises assumptions 
about the historical development of Hong Kong cinema.
Chapter One assesses how the colonial government kept the rules and 
regulations of its censorship system in the 1 9 5 0 s and 1 9 6 0 s shrouded in 
mystery, so that it could “maintain its façade of apolitical unity during 
the Cold War” (p. 3 6 ) to help stabilise its shaky grasp on power. This 
chapter contextualises the conditions that restrained filmmakers’ political 
expression, setting the stage for the proceeding chapters. Particularly useful 
is Chang’s utilisation of various primary sources, including newspaper 
articles and archival government documents, to outline the different forces 
at battle with each other in Hong Kong, including the Kuomintang and the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the role played by CCP propaganda 
organs such as the Southern Film Corporation (Nanfang yingye youxian 
gongsi 南方影業有限公司). Since the colonial government genuinely 
feared that films with overtly political stances could mobilise audiences 
and lead to public disturbances (p. 3 9 ), their censorship policies aimed 
to depoliticise culture and create the image of an apolitical community 
on screen. Chapter Two assesses how the colonial government promoted 
their own ideological agenda and image both within and outside of Hong 
Kong through focusing on the government-produced Hong Kong Film Unit 
series of documentaries (1 9 5 0 s-early 1 9 6 0 s), as well as their attempts to 
ingratiate themselves with the local populace by exhibiting the films in 
mobile cinemas in areas with no local cinemas and few televisions. Chang 
highlights how the Hong Kong government “moved from indifference 
to recognising the role of film in co-opting audiences as partners in the 
screening of their own collective post-war identities” (p. 4 7 ).
Chapter Three assesses how Cantonese left-leaning filmmakers at studios 
such as Union Film Enterprise Ltd. (Zhonglian dianying qiye youxian gongsi 
中聯電影企業有限公司) reinterpreted the May Fourth tenets of anti-
feudalism and gender equality in the depoliticised arena of Hong Kong. 
This process inscribed “Hong Kong audiences in the discursive ‘screened’ 
construction of Chinese nationalism and nation building beyond strictly 
party-based rhetoric” (p. 1 0 1 ). Several times in Chapter Two Chang 
mentions that the colonial government sought to use film to educate 
audiences about civic responsibility (see pp. 5 1 , 5 2 , and 5 7 ). This idea of 
cinema as a pedagogic tool was also key to many left-leaning filmmakers; 
for instance the Union filmmakers attempted to balance entertainment 
with a “moral cinematic education” (p. 8 0 ). From their “cultural elite status” 
they sought to educate audiences (p. 8 2 ) and they “unanimously regarded 
cinema as a medium to teach audiences how to be good, morally upright 
people who would serve society and love culture” (p. 8 3 ). This sounds 
surprisingly similar to the way the colonial government sought to educate 
audiences about “civic responsibility.” What were the similarities and 
differences between them, and how did left-leaning filmmakers resist the 
political ideas in documentaries made by the government? More detailed 
analysis from both ideological and stylistic perspectives would have 
provided a better understanding of the overlaps and divergences in how 
such communities were constructed on-screen by each institution and how 
each type of film operated in its pedagogic aspects. 
The highlight of the book for this reader is Chapter Four, in which Chang 
discusses the lunlipian (倫理片). The lunlipian was an important genre in 
the filmmaking practices of 1 9 5 0 s and 1 9 6 0 s Hong Kong cinema, utilised 
as a generic marker by contemporary film critics and also as a marketing 
strategy by studios. Chang discusses the cultural significance of this form 
within its social history and also clears up the confusing interchangeability 
between the terms lunlipian and wenyipian (文藝片), and the differing 
English translations for the former term. This is helpful for all scholarship on 
Hong Kong cinema from the 1 9 5 0 s to the 1 9 7 0 s, since the term lunlipian 
is rarely used in English language scholarship, whereas various different 
English translations such as “social ethics films,” “(family) melodrama,” or 
“social realist film” are. Chang specifically illustrates how she sees “lunli” 
as a concept of address, deduced from excellent in-depth analysis of the 
production companies’ promotional materials and two 1 9 6 0 s genre-
blending lunlipian, which function to construct local community based on 
communal solidarity, family values, and “a renegotiation of what constitutes 
traditional Chinese culture in post-war Hong Kong” (p. 1 1 2 ). The Cantonese 
lunlipian’s genre-blending development in the 1 9 6 0 s is often criticised as 
favouring entertainment over ethical concerns compared to 1 9 5 0 s iterations, 
but Chang’s argument that this genre-blending is a natural progression for 
the Cantonese lunlipian in line with stiff competition from Mandarin and 
foreign films and evolving socio-political conditions is a fruitful one that 
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helps reconsider the generic and thematic connections between 1 9 5 0 s and 
1 9 6 0 s Cantonese cinema. 
Chapters Five and Six expand outward, to Southeast Asia (Nanyang 
南洋), and forward, to the late 1 9 6 0 s, to assess different strategies and 
developments in how filmmakers screened, and constructed, communities 
on-screen in Hong Kong cinema. The latter chapter helps with understanding 
how the “factory girl” series of films offer narratives articulating female 
emancipation and a fantasy of factory life, but perhaps more analysis on 
how these films posit that sacrificing oneself for capitalism is a noble pursuit 
would help illuminate their ideology in relation to local identity. 
It would also have been interesting to see consideration of Mandarin left-
leaning/left-wing films to enrich our understanding of the industrial and 
creative milieu of the time. Overall, Chang’s book contributes greatly to 
reassessments of Hong Kong film history and demonstrates the importance 
of archival research. Her screening communities lens focuses clearly 
on how different parties with different political affiliations, commercial 
considerations, and agendas all utilised cinema to take part in the 
construction of Hong Kong’s post-war communities.
I Tom Cunliffe is a PhD graduate and early career researcher from 
SOAS. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London, WCH1 0XG, UK (229623@
soas.ac.uk). 
In this book, Joshua Eisenman presents a revisionist approach to the Chinese People’s Communes era (1 9 5 8 -1 9 8 3 ). One of his main goals is to question common narratives in Chinese and Western research 
that the communes would have been an economic failure and that only 
decollectivisation under Deng Xiaoping in the 1 9 8 0 s set agriculture on the 
right track. Eisenman is not motivated by nostalgia for so-called Maoist 
“egalitarianism.” Rather, he argues strictly in economic terms, claiming that 
the communes were a successful model to modernise agriculture, increase 
productivity in grain production, and promote the green revolution, at least in 
the 1 9 7 0 s. This institution would have allowed the state to enforce household 
austerity in the villages, reallocating these savings for investment in machinery, 
irrigation systems, fertilizers, small factories, or agricultural schools.  
Eisenman introduces the reader to several changes in the commune 
system: For example, the period of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) (1 9 5 8 -6 1 ) 
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was characterised by over-saving and unproductive investments such as the 
steel campaign. The Rightist Commune (1 9 6 2 -6 4 ) in the aftermath of the 
famine resulted in under-saving. According to Eisenman, the best model was 
the Green Revolution Commune (1 9 7 0 -7 9 ) characterised by high saving 
rates allocated to useful and productive investments. In Chapter Four, he 
uses neoclassic economic growth models from Solow-Swan and Arthur 
Lewis to prove this argument. Most of the data sets in the book are taken 
from official Chinese statistics published in the 1 9 8 0 s. 
In Chapter Five on politics, Eisenman argues that the communes would 
have been the “churches” of Maoism (p. 2 5 4 ). With rituals like songs, dance, or 
readings of the Little Red Book, the Party indoctrinated commune members 
to work hard, to be self-reliant, to consume little and to save resources. By 
doing so, politics contributed to the communes’ accumulation of capital. In 
the last part of the book, Eisenman argues that the communes did not face 
an economic crisis when Deng came to power after 1 9 7 8 . It would have been 
much more a political decision of the Party leadership to gradually dissolve 
the communes in order to bury the collectivist ideology of the Mao era. 
Red China’s Green Revolution is a thoughtful provocation and should be 
discussed. To combine approaches from neoclassical economy, organisational 
theory, history, and politics is innovative, but not always easy to follow. The 
author presents himself as a “young Turk” challenging the field. However, he 
does not engage with major academic works related to his topic and even 
ignores them. For example, Kenneth Walker published several books and 
articles on grain production in the commune era, using official statistics from 
the 1 9 8 0 s, and re-evaluating them in a critical way (Walker 1 9 8 4 ). Robert 
Ash also came to a much less rosy conclusion than Eisenman (Ash 1 9 9 8 , 
2 0 0 6 : 9 9 3 ). This is also true for prominent Chinese scholar Wen Tiejun 溫
鐵軍, who has argued that low agricultural prices helped the industries and 
cities to develop at the expense of the countryside (Wen 2 0 0 0 : 1 7 5 -7 ). A key 
institution in this context was the state monopoly for the purchase and sale 
of grain, which is hardly mentioned by Eisenman. 
Some scholars have argued that late Maoism in the 1 9 7 0 s was quite 
successful in economic and social development. However, if Eisenman wants 
to prove that the 1 9 7 0 s were more successful than the decollectivisation 
era, he should have compared both periods. Instead, his data sets end mostly 
in 1 9 7 9  or 1 9 8 3 .
Eisenman argues that after the end of the GLF there is no evidence that 
commune members were “starving or too hungry to work” (xxiv). It seems 
to be true that no massive-scale deadly famine took place in China after 
1 9 6 2 . I have proposed that the government had learnt lessons from the 
Great Leap to lower the peasants’ burden, to limit the growth of the urban 
population, and to import grain to feed the cities. These policies were more 
important to prevent famine than the slight increase in grain production 
per head (Wemheuer 2 0 1 4 : 1 4 2 -7 ). A repetition of the Great Famine was 
avoided; however, several reports show that in some regions, peasants faced 
malnutrition and hunger even in the late commune era (Chen 1 9 9 8 ; Fu, Hu, 
and Feng 2 0 0 8 ). By the end of the Mao era, peasants ate fewer fine grains (rice 
and wheat) and more unpopular coarse grains (sweet potato etc.) than they 
had 2 0  years before (Ash 2 0 0 6 : 9 9 0 ). By international standards, the Chinese 
population could not eat their fill in the Mao era. Only in 1 9 7 8  could China 
for the first time meet the minimum level of basic nutrition of over 2 ,4 0 0  
calories a day per person, as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
(Nussbaumer and Ruthemann 2 0 0 3 , Vol. 1 : 1 1 6 ).
In Eisenman’s book, we learn little about peasants’ reactions to changes in 
the commune system. However, several studies show that they developed a set 
of strategies to hide resources from the state such as stealing, “eating green” 
